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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5064
Does foreign aid spent on trade facilitation increase trade 
flows of developing countries? There is an on-going and 
high profile discussion of aid-for-trade associated with 
the Doha negotiations of the World Trade Organization. 
There continue also questions about how best to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals. The analysis in 
this paper explicitly considers how to target aid most 
effectively to increase trade – a fundamental question 
related to the crisis and policy debate over restarting 
the world trading system. Using detailed data on aid 
flows from the OECD, the analysis here estimates the 
responsiveness of trade flows to specific types of foreign 
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department to explore the linkages between trade costs, facilitation, and economic development with support through 
the Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development. The project website is accessible at: http://econ.worldbank.org/
projects/trade_costs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at helblem@who.int, clmann@brandeis.edu , and jswilson@worldbank.org.
aid. The findings indicate that aid directed toward 
promoting trade enhances the trade performance of 
recipient countries: a 1 percent increase in aid directed 
toward trade policy and regulatory reform (amounting 
to about US$11.7 million more such aid) could generate 
an increase in global trade of about US$818 million. 
This yields a “rate of return” on every dollar of this 
type of aid of about US$697 in additional trade. As 
the dollar aid flow is relatively small, such targeted aid 
mitigates concerns about absorptive capacity and real 
exchange rate appreciation, which may accompany larger 
disbursements.  
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper brings together two strands of research to examine the specific question of 
whether foreign aid directed toward the trade facilitation agenda has increased trade of 
developing countries.  The two strands of research are first, the relationship between 
trade facilitation and trade flows, and the second is the relationship between aid flows 
and trade flows.  We wish to marry these two lines of research because of the 
increasingly important constellation of issues surrounding trade, aid, and development 
policies, as well as the increased attention to aid effectiveness and aid-for-trade in trade 
negotiations and other multilateral forums.  The main strength of our approach is that we 
use detailed data on types of aid flows, which allows us to examine the relationship 
between aid-and-trade according to different classifications of the type of aid extended 
and received.  
 
The linkages between trade facilitation, trade, and development are relatively simple in 
theory.  Development is enhanced through income growth, which comes from the 
expansion of trade, investment, and production opportunities.  Trade facilitation 
initiatives, with the aim of lowering trade transactions costs, can enhance trade 
competitiveness, and expand trade flows, while at the same time playing an important 
role in supporting a positive business climate.     
 
In practice, implementing trade facilitation initiatives involves the domestic reform 
agenda, private sector priorities, and national development strategies.  Trade facilitation 
reform requires self-assessment, technical assistance, and capacity building.   In other 
words, trade facilitation reforms are difficult to do and cost money.     
 
Hence, with greater attention to the potential gains to trade facilitation reforms has come 
greater attention to how to enable and finance those reforms.  The trade facilitation 
agenda is part of the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization. Other 
multilateral institutions and other groups have established task forces and research 
programs to understand better the impact of trade facilitation reform on development, 
how lower trade costs affect trade, and, importantly for this research paper, what role aid 
and technical assistance have in supporting development and poverty reduction goals.
5   
 
Empirical research on trade facilitation has largely focused on the question: What is trade 
facilitation and how does it work to enhance trade?  A number of studies provide strong 
evidence that improvements in trade-facilitation— for example improvement in port and 
information infrastructure, more rapid customs clearance time, or regulatory reform to 
remove duplicative technical requirements on imports have a positive impact on trade 
                                                 
5 One example of a public private dialogue on trade facilitation reform is the Global Partnership for 
Transport and Trade which brings together international agencies in trade facilitation, such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank, and World Customs Unions (for 
more information: http://www.gfptt.org). The World Bank has had an on-going research project on the 
relationships between trade facilitation and trade performance, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/trade_costs   2
performance.
6  Case study evidence complements econometric work, and explores the 
cost and complexity of implementing comprehensive reform at the country level.  Our 
analysis seeks to further inform discussion on these topics and addresses specifically 
what role aid directed toward trade facilitation reforms can play to expand trade. 
 
The majority of studies conducted on aid and trade find a positive relationship between 
aid and trade.  The direction of causality is unclear, however, as development funding 
from developed to developing countries has been historically tied back to developed 
countries in some manner (and some aid remains tied in this manner).
 7  Moreover, the 
relationship between aid and growth is complex with the significance, direction of 
causality, and sign of the relationship subject to debate, in part because of how aid can 
impact trade through real exchange rates.  Does targeting aid more explicitly to certain 
kinds of policies mitigate these concerns?      
 
In bringing together the strands of the literature on trade facilitation and trade, and on aid 
and trade, our research in this paper finds strong empirical evidence that aid directed to 
the trade facilitation reform agenda has a small, but significant and positive impact on 
trade flows.  The bulk of the relationship between aid and trade appears to come from a 
narrow set of aid flows directed toward trade policy and regulatory reform, rather than 
broader aid-for-trade categories directed toward sectoral trade development or 
infrastructure development.  Therefore, we suggest that, starting from the composition of 
aid flows that we observe today, relatively small additions to the aid flow that are 
directed toward the trade policy and regulatory reform agenda could have high 
effectiveness to increase trade of the recipient countries, and around the world.     
 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review the literature on trade 
facilitation and on aid and trade, as our analysis links these two parts of the economic 
literature.  In section three, we discuss the data and empirical methods employed here.  
Section four summarizes the estimation results including several robustness checks.  
Section five concludes.    
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The empirical literature relevant for our study can be divided in two parts. First is the 
literature that investigates the impact of trade facilitation on trade flows.  A quick review 
of this literature helps us better understand how trade facilitation measures enhance the 
integration of developing countries into the trading system and global markets.  Second is 
the literature that relates aid to trade and more broadly to economic growth.  We 
reference here in this paper some of the important contributions to understanding these 
                                                 
6 For a compendium of research and analysis on trade facilitation and economic development see; 
http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/trade_costs 
7 See Wagner (2003) for a recent overview of tied aid and Nelson (2007) for a literature review on the 
trade-aid debate.  See also Morrissey, 1991; McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998; Lloyd et al., 2000; Osei et 
al., 2004.   3
linkages and discuss the literature as it relates to our analysis.  This review provides 
context as to why our more focused approach makes a contribution to understanding the 
relationship between aid on trade flows and on the question of aid effectiveness.   
 
The literature on trade facilitation (TF) and trade is relatively new and has proceeded 
along three paths:  (1) Econometric analysis of one area of TF for a set of countries,  (2) 
econometric modeling of multiple areas of TF and multiple countries, and (3) case studies 
of TF in a single-country setting.   
 
The advantage of deep analysis of one type of TF is that researchers can bring to bear 
extensive granularity in the data, such as density of firms next to major roads to ports, or 
number of web-hosts, or aflatoxin regulations, and investigate the impact of changes in 
those specific TF aspects on trade prospects of one or a group of countries. 
8   But, such 
deep, but narrow investigations cannot determine whether the specific TF aspect being 
investigated is the most important factor underpinning a country’s trade flows because 
the specific TF area is not analyzed in a comparative setting inclusive of other areas of 
potential TF reform. 
 
A second line of inquiry utilizes econometric modeling of trade effects (using either CGE 
or gravity models) of TF reforms in multiple countries.  The CGE approach usually 
proxies TF with trade cost or productivity parameters, but there is little mapping of these 
generalized parameters into areas of TF reform.
9 Therefore, we know that lower trade 
costs enhance trade, but not through which TF channels.   
 
The gravity models incorporate more TF areas (hard infrastructure such as ports and soft 
infrastructure such as regulatory adherence, among others) and thus allow for more 
distinction about which areas of TF reform relate to the greater gains in trade.
10  
Decomposing the country set into regions or different levels of income (as in Wilson, 
Mann, Otsuki, 2005) shows that for some countries and some regions, investment in 
infrastructure is strongly related to trade, whereas for other countries or regions, 
                                                 
8 For example, research that focuses on TF efforts in the area of ports and transportation includes Hummels 
(2001), Clark, X., D. Dollar and A. Micco. (2002); and Shepherd and Wilson (2007) on road network 
quality.  Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002a) address anticompetitive practices in port services; and Hausman, 
Lee, and Subramanian (2005),  and Nordis, Pinali, Grosso (2006 ) consider logistics and shipping time; and 
most recently a comprehensive look at ports and related infrastructures in IADB (2008).   Analysis of other 
specific aspects of trade facilitation include Freund and Weinhold (2000) on the Internet; Fink, Mattoo, and 
Neagu (2002b) on communication costs; Moenius (2000, 2004) on bilaterally shared standards and Chen, et 
al (2006) on meeting foreign standards, and Shepherd and Wilson (2007) on standards in textiles, clothing, 
and footwear; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, 2001b) on food safety standards.  In addition, see 
Hausman, Warren H.; Lee, Hau L.; and Subramanian, Uma. 2005. “Global Logistics Indicators, 
Supply Chain Metrics, and Bilateral Trade Patterns.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3773 (November). 
 
9 CGE with TF proxied by trade cost or productivity parameters including, APEC (1999), UNCTAD 
(2001), Walkenhorst and Yasui (2003).    
10 Gravity models incorporating border and behind-the-border TF measures, including Wilson, Mann, 
Otsuki (2003, 2005); OECD (2005); Francois and Manchin (2007). Soloaga, Wilson, Mejia. (2005) 
evaluate the sectoral impact of changes in trade facilitation measures in Mexico. See also Bouet, Mishra, 
Roy (2008) for Africa.    4
improvements in soft infrastructure (regulatory reform) are more strongly related to trade 
flows. 
 
The majority of econometric empirical studies on the topic of trade facilitation conclude 
that improvements in trade facilitation measures are associated with increases in trade 
flows. The various trade facilitation measures examined --streamlining customs 
procedures, improving port efficiency, harmonizing to international standards, and other 
reforms —work through different channels to lower trade costs for importers and 
exporters.
11 For some countries, the trade gains from reforms can exceed estimated trade 
gains from tariff reductions. 
12  
 
These econometric studies have focused on the gains from trade facilitation—but how 
costly are these gains to obtain?  Duval (2006) gathers expert opinions on the costs and 
benefits of twelve different types of trade facilitation measures. According to the experts 
consulted, the long-term benefits greatly exceed the cost for implementation of all 
measures.  An alternative approach to explore the costs and benefits of trade facilitation 
is case study analysis.
 13  Case studies of TF reforms in specific countries are valuable as 
they can explicitly address and estimate the costs of engaging in detailed reform and also 
consider the benefits of specific reform measures.  The question of the cost of reform is a 
key component that links the two parts of our paper and provides the rationale for this 
work.     
 
There is also research on the question of aid and economic growth more generally.  This 
literature is extensive; and the analytical methods and the results subject to significant 
debate.  A comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper.  It is 
useful, however, to highlight some of the complexities in analyzing the relationships 
between aid, trade, and growth.
14  
 
With regard to aid and trade, debate continues on the causality of the two variables. Until 
the late 1990s a considerable share of official development aid was tied to donor trade.  
Thus, any positive trade-aid relationship could be due to endogenous policy decisions 
made in donor countries.  Indeed, researchers have found strong links between foreign 
aid and donor exports with an elasticity of greater than one in a gravity model.
15  
                                                 
11 There may as well be broad-based domestic benefits, through, for example, improved road and ICT 
networks, improved institutions, and reduced corruption, although these research papers do not address 
these domestic benefits directly.  
12 For example see; Hummels, David; Minor, Peter; Reisman, Matthew; and Endean, Erin. 2007. 
“Calculating Tariff Equivalents for Time in Trade.” Prepared for USAID Bureau of Economic 
Growth, Agriculture and Trade under Contract No. GS-10F-0619N, Task Order No. 
EEM-M-00-06-00028-00. Arlington, VA: Nathan Associates Inc. 
 
13 Specific countries and specific types of TF reforms, including for example the country studies in Wilson, 
Mann, Pau, Assanie, Choi (2002) Moise (2003)   
14 Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007) provide a complete and excellent overview of the topic.  
15 For example, Nilsson (1997) observes for trade between the EU and recipient countries that $1 of aid 
generated $2.6 of exports from donor to recipient for the period 1975 to 1992. Wagner finds that increasing 
aid to a country by 1 % increases the donor exports to the recipient by 1.33 %. Other researchers have 
explored additional links that may exist between the donor and recipient that may lead to additional trade,   5
Endogeneity could run the other direction—from trade to aid—in that some donors 
allocate aid to those countries with whom they have the strongest trade ties.
16  Analysis 
that tests for the direction of causality generally conclude that it depends on the pair of 
donor and recipient countries.
17  Even if endogenous, the results suggest a positive 
relationship between aid and trade.   
 
The literature on aid and growth disagrees on whether there is a positive relationship 
between aid and growth.
18  There may be many reasons for this, including the type of aid 
delivered (for example, humanitarian vs. policy relevant) and absorptive capacity in 
developing countries.
 19   One reason cited for the lack of a positive relationship between 
aid and growth is an aid-induced appreciation of real exchange rates—e.g. the aid-
induced Dutch disease or the ‘transfer paradox’.
20  Since the real exchange rate is a key 
channel through which aid for trade gains could be eroded, we are concerned about this 
issue in the context of our study of aid for trade facilitation.  
 
Recent surveys conclude that the econometric estimates of whether aid induces a “Dutch 
disease” phenomenon can vary widely.  This depends upon assumptions about the 
marginal productivity of additional aid and public expenditures, the complementarities 
between public and private capital, and the degree of flexibility of labor and other key 
resources.
21  In addition, Devarajan et al. (2008), using a CGE model, argue that an aid-
induced real exchange rate appreciation is more likely if aid flows are volatile and 
thereby induce sub-optimal consumption and investment planning over time.  
 
How does our paper bring together these two major research strands to address questions 
about the impact of aid on trade?  The main purpose of our study is to evaluate the impact 
of aid flows targeted for trade facilitation measures on trade flows. We link “aid-for-trade 
facilitation” flows to trade flows through the black box that relates aid to trade facilitation 
reform:  Certain types of aid flows promote certain reforms or change certain 
infrastructures which reduce trade transaction costs and thus enhance trade flows.  We 
address the issue of causality by considering a subset of official development assistance, 
as well as through robustness checks.  The issue of aid-induced Dutch disease, while 
relevant in a broader context, is not likely to be an issue in our analysis. Aid delivered for 
trade facilitation goals examined here, in contrast to other aid objectives, is numerically 
small and therefore very unlikely to precipitate any real exchange rate appreciation.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as political or economic considerations (Lloyd et al., 2000).  But also, see Nelson and Silva (2008) for 
a recent analysis that obtains much smaller number using a fixed effects gravity model estimation.  
16Morrissey, 1993; Osei et al., 2004  
17Lloyd et al. (2000) as well as Arvin et al. (2000).   
18 See Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) for a survey and new assessment.   
19 See Radelet, Clemens, Bhavnani (2005), Chapter 4 in OECD (2006). 
20 The effect is well known: aid flows may be used to finance expenditures of non-tradable goods and 
services, leading to a rise of their relative price with respect to tradable goods and thus, to a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate. This causes a significant squeeze on the exporting sector, as resources 
are transferred from the tradable to non-tradable sectors. 
21See Adam (2006), Radelet, Clemens and Bhavnani (2006),Rajan and Subramanian (2005b), Chatterjee 
and Turnovsky (2005).     6
Two previous studies are similar to our analysis here.  These studies focus not on various 
types of trade facilitation aid, however, (which affects both imports and exports), but on 
projects that focus on export promotion only.  Brenton and von Uexkull (2009) evaluate 
whether technical assistance in export development programs have been successful. The 
authors find that on average these programs have induced a stronger export performance 
in the targeted products.  With respect to the effectiveness of export promotion agencies 
(EPAs), Lederman, Olarreaga, and Payton (2006) find that EPAs, on average, have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on exports. Nevertheless, they find that the 
impact is heterogeneous across regions: larger effects were found in Latin American and 
Asian agencies, while agencies in Sub-Saharan African, the Middle East and North 
Africa lag behind. 
 
To summarize, while there have been efforts to analyze the mechanisms behind trade 
facilitation and to show how aid and trade are related, to our knowledge no study as yet 
has made the link between the two.  Our study shows how aid directed towards trade 
facilitation measures may be related to trade flows. Given the increased focus on aid in 
the trade negotiating context, as well as the increased interest in aid effectiveness, it 
makes sense to take a look at these links.  The next section discusses the data and 
methodology. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.1. Data 
 
The key ingredient of this paper is the disaggregated data on aid flows.  Data on aid flows 
for the years 1990 to 2005 come from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (OECD-
CRS) database, which documents Official Development Aid (ODA) flows from donor to 
recipient countries starting in the year 1973.  This database is very comprehensive and 
covers almost every country of the world.  It includes aid extended by about 40 individual 
country donors as well as multilateral agencies.  Each entry contains the value of the aid 
flow from donor to the recipient including a description of the aid according a specific 
classification system (both in words and five digit code).  According to the WTO/OECD 
(2006) almost US $ 8.7 billion (in 2005) or 21.3 % of all ODA (excluding debt relief) 
was directed towards the Aid-for-Trade agenda, which is the focus of our analysis.
22   
 




1)  Trade policy and regulation (US$ 296 million in 2005)
24: Comprises aid flows to 
facilitate the participation in multilateral trade negotiations and to improve the 
                                                 
22 The Aid-for-Trade agenda originated in the single-undertaking of the Uruguay Round, developed in the 
context of the Integrated Framework (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, WTO, OECD/DAC as an observer), 
and then received further impetus in the Gleneagles G8 summit and WTO ministerial in Hong Kong in 
2005.   
23 See Appendix for the full CRS classification for the three functional areas.     7
implementation of multilateral trade agreements. Furthermore, it contains all 
support to mainstream trade policy, including technical standards, customs 
regimes, and tariff structure.  
 
2)  Trade development (US$ 2910 million in 2005): This category covers business 
development and activities aimed at improving the business climate, access to 
trade finance, and trade promotion in the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
industry, mining, tourism, and services.  
 
3)  Economic infrastructure (US$ 5586 million in 2005): All aid flows directed 
towards the improvement of the infrastructure for transport, storage, 
communications and energy. 
 
For our study, all three categories are relevant for trade facilitation. But, a key objective 
of our study is to investigate which type of aid-for-trade-facilitation has been particularly 
effective, so we consider alternative aggregations of aid flows using the raw data from 
the OECD-CRS.  Our aggregations are chosen to better match the trade facilitation 
reforms in the literature typified by Wilson, Mann, Otsuki (2003, 2005). The appendix 
presents the correspondence between categories and codes used by the OECD-CRS and 
the four classifications that we use. 
 
1)  Narrow trade facilitation (US$ 296 million in 2005) includes all five digit 
codes belonging to Trade Policy and Regulations (chapter 331, as explained 
in the Appendix).  This narrow agenda focuses on both border (customs, TBT, 
RTAs) and behind the border (SPS, TRIPS) reforms found by the trade 
facilitation research to be importantly related to trade flows.   
 
2)  Broad  trade facilitation (US$ 8495 million in 2005), which sums up the aid 
flows from the other two categories, Trade Development and Economic 
Infrastructure.  This broad category includes both border (ports, roads) and 
services (telecoms, finance) infrastructures shown by the trade facilitation 
research to be importantly related to trade.  This category also includes sector-
specific initiatives.  
  
3)  Hard trade facilitation (US$ 6086 million in 2005) includes aid directed 
towards investment into infrastructure projects, such as upgrading of ports and 
construction of new roads. Most of the hard aid is also classified as broad aid, 
but there are some projects in the broad category that we classify as soft 
projects, specifically those related to the banking and financial services and 
training services that are sector-focused.   
 
4)  Soft trade facilitation (US$ 2705 million in 2005)  includes funds directed 
toward building institutional capacity related to trade, such as a training of 
customs officials, streamlining  custom procedures, projects related to banking 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 See WTO/OECD (2006) for definitions, and values of aid flows for 2005.    8
and finance, and projects that deliver education and training, whether general 
or sector-focused.    
 
We include distributed aid flows for the same 16 years, 1990 to 2005, as for the trade 
flows.
25  Figure 1 shows the relative magnitudes of these categories of flows and how 
they change from 1990 to 2005. As shown, funding for broad trade facilitation 
(economic infrastructure and trade development) accounts for about 96 % of aid-for-trade 
facilitation in 2005. In the same year, hard trade facilitation projects account for about 
70 % of aid-for-trade facilitation.  We can see in Figure 1 that the shares of broad vs. 
narrow (and hard versus soft) have hardly changed over time.  Although the importance 
of trade policy and regulation (our narrow category) increased through 2005 this 
category remains very small. 
26  
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The gravity equation approach that we use requires some additional variables.  Overall, 
our data set combines information from four different sources: the World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS) database for trade flows and tariffs, the Centre d'études 
prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII) database for bilateral data (such as 
distances between trading partners) and country-specific data (such as a country's area), 
                                                 
25 The limitation to sixteen years stems from the availability of consistent trade data.  
26 In fact, the Appendix table shows that both the amount and share of disbursements of this category of aid 
were smaller in 2007 than 2005.     9
the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset for GDP and population data, as well 
as the OECD-CRS for aid flows. 
 
From WITS, we include 115,230 positive trade flows for 167 importers (reporters) and 
172 exporters (partners) for the years 1990 to 2005.  Tariff data for effective applied rates 
(simple average) are included from the TRAINS database where available, and where the 
data are unavailable, the closest year’s data are chosen with older data chosen in the event 
of a tie. Information is included for each EU member as an individual country, as well as 
the EU as a whole.  The CEPII data on distances was simply joined to the trade data.
27  
Yearly data from the WDI on GDP (in USD at then current price levels) and population 
as well as data from CEPII about other country-specific data (such as area or language) 
was added to the corresponding countries and then also joined to the trade data.  
 
III.2. Methodology  
 
Our methodology is the popular gravity model equation, which has only gotten more 
popular since the micro-foundations proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 
2004).  From basic microeconomic principles, they derive a gravity-like model of exports 
from country i to country j in sector k (
k
ij X ): 














ij P t Y Y E X                log 1 log 1 log 1 log log log log   
Where 
k
i Y is the output of country i in sector k; 
k
j E  stands for the expenditure of country j 
in sector k; 
k
t Y  denotes aggregate (world) output in sector k;  k   is the elasticity of 
substitution in sector k; 
k
ij t  are trade costs facing exports from country i to country j in 
sector k; 
k
j i,   = Country i’s/j’s output share in sector k; and finally 
k
ij   stands for the 
random error term, satisfying the usual assumptions.  
 
The main innovation in Anderson and van Wincoop’s work is the inward and outward 












k k k t P
1
1 1 1   
  takes into 
account that j’s imports from i depend on trade costs across all exporters. The outward 












k k k t P
1
1 1 1   
  describes, by analogy, that the exports from i 
to j are affected by the trade costs across all importers. 
 
The data requirements for the multilateral resistance terms exceed what is generally 
available, so the standard solution is to use fixed-effects estimation.  Fixed-effects could 
be country-specific (for each importer and exporter) or bilateral fixed effects (for each 
bilateral country pair in the sample).  Bilateral fixed effects capture many of the standard 
                                                 
27 In order to create distance data for the EU, we simply used Luxembourg’s geographical data. We 
consider this assumption as appropriate taking into account that Luxembourg is centrally located within 
Europe and very close to the geographic center of the EU15.   10
variables included in gravity equations, such as distance, language, colonial ties.  Since 
our research exploits the time series variation in the trade and aid data to investigate the 
relationship, we incorporate both time fixed effects as well as time-varying bilateral fixed 
effects. The time dimension of the time-varying bilateral fixed effects is an average over 
five years. As we use yearly aggregate trade flows, a time variation by year would not be 
feasible. In other words, for every pair of countries we have three time-varying (for the 
years 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2005) bilateral fixed effects.   
 
 
We are now able to postulate that bilateral imports  ijt t  are a function of the country-




     ijt t jt it it jt it ijT ijt ETFA ITFA Y Y t                   5 4 3 2 1 1 log ) log( log log
   
 
αijT denotes all bilateral 5-years fixed effects between country i and j. Yit and Yjt measure 
the GDP in both countries in year t. The importer’s applied tariff is   ijt   1 . The aid for 
trade facilitation flows received in year t by the importer is denoted as ITFAit, whereas 
ETFAjt measures the aid received by the exporter.  These aid flows represent the sum of 
aid received from bilateral donors.
28 γt stands for the year fixed effects and εijt  is the 
residual. The following section presents the estimation results for the model developed 
above and conducts several robustness tests in order to test the validity of our results.  
 
IV. Estimation Results  
In this section, we consider several different permutations of our main specification.  The 
first step is simply to establish whether aid for trade facilitation is related to trade flows.  
The second step considers whether this relationship is different for different country 
groups, in particular focusing on the tied-aid issue.  The third question relates to lagged 
effects of aid.  Finally, we consider how the relationship between aid for trade facilitation 
and trade might vary with the type of aid flow.   
IV.1. Main Specification and Disaggregations  
 
Table 1 shows estimation results using bilateral non-zero trade data and several different 
permutations of countries receiving aid-for-trade facilitation flows over the years 1990 to 
2005.  In the first two columns, trade between all 167 exporters and 172 importers in our 
sample is considered. The common variables, such as GDP and tariff, have the expected 
signs and magnitude. The two variables that capture that amount of aid for trade 
facilitation received (ln_itfa: aid received by importers and ln_etfa: aid received by 
                                                 
28 We exclude multilateral aid flows as it is rather difficult to contribute multilateral aid flows to certain 
countries. In addition, multilateral A4TF amounted to less than one sixth of all A4TF in all years.    11
exporters) are both positive and strongly significant. The magnitude is higher for the 
importing than for the exporting country and is rather small (0.004 vs 0.002). Column (2) 
is a robustness check on the inclusion of real GDP per capita for importers and exporters.   
The significance level of our variables of interest changes only slightly, the magnitude of 
the import coefficient is a bit lower, but the sum of the coefficient estimates is about the 
same.    
 
There are several additional ways to cut the data to determine to what extent aid for trade 
facilitation (A4TF) might affect trade.  Column (3) narrows the sample to just recipients 
of A4TF and investigates whether the relationship between A4TF and trade is more 
apparent.  In this select sample of countries, receiving A4TF is more strongly and 
significantly associated with exports, but not with imports from other A4TF countries.  
Column (4) continues to consider only the aid recipients, but broadens the possible 
trading partners to all partners.  The export coefficient is smaller than for the select 
country group, but bigger than the baseline specification of countries, and it appears that 
A4TF facilitates imports from countries that are not A4TF recipients with a higher 
elasticity than in the baseline specification of countries.   
 
On balance, the significance of the A4TF coefficients are relatively robust across these 
various permutations of which countries receive aid and trade with each other.   Based on 
the column (1) estimate (which is the relatively more conservative coefficient estimate), a 
1 % increase in aid for trade facilitation (about US$ 88 million in 2005) would yield an 
increase of global trade of about US$ 415 million.  
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Estimation Results (Bilateral 5-Years Fixed Effects and Year Fixed 
Effects Included) 
 


































ln_tariff -0.199***  -0.199***  -0.247**  -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.200***  -0.210*** 
  [0.035] [0.035] [0.105] [0.048]  [0.043]  [0.036] [0.075] 
ln_rep_gdp 0.709***  1.561***  -4.599***  0.722 1.482*** 1.506***  3.744*** 
  [0.045] [0.323] [1.289] [0.486]  [0.466]  [0.327] [1.022] 
ln_part_gdp  0.255*** -0.704*** -7.281*** -2.380*** -1.496*** -0.760***  -0.084 
  [0.036] [0.271] [1.746] [0.497]  [0.413]  [0.275] [0.614] 
ln_itfa  0.004***  0.003** 0.029  0.006** 0.003*  0.003** 0.002 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.041] [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001] [0.003] 
ln_etfa  0.002* 0.002** 0.088**  0.005*  0.000  0.002**  0.002 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.036] [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.001] [0.002] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.853***  5.202***  -0.042 -0.671  -0.797**  -3.348*** 
   [0.320] [1.273] [0.477]  [0.452]  [0.324] [1.032]   12
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.964*** 7.618*** 2.632*** 1.628*** 1.019***  0.376 
   [0.265] [1.732] [0.486]  [0.402]  [0.269] [0.602] 
L.ln_itfa           0.002 
           [0.004] 
L2.ln_itfa           0.006 
           [0.004] 
L.ln_etfa           0.003* 
           [0.002] 
L2.ln_etfa           0.001 
           [0.001] 
Observations 108,304  107,806  12,214 51,652  57,855  104,644 32592 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Includes Bilateral 5-years fixed effects and year fixed effects  
 
As part of our analysis we also examine whether the import effect may be due to tied-aid 
or because aid facilitates imports from rich (and therefore more likely donor) economies.  
First, we remove the donor economies completely from the sample (column 5). We 
observe that A4TF has facilitated imports from other developing countries, however, our 
regression result suggests that there was no effect on exports directed to the latter group. 
A4TF flows thus do not seem to have boosted trade among developing countries taken as 
a whole group (not just A4TF recipients).  So, ‘south-south’ trade does not appear to 
benefit particularly from aid for trade facilitation.   
 
We then include the bilateral flows between the recipient economies, other developing 
countries and the donors, but exclude intra-donor trade flows (column (6)).  When intra-
donor trade is completely removed from the sample, the significance of A4TF for 
exporters returns. So, aid for trade facilitation may be more positively associated with 
exports to donor economies than to other developing countries.   
 
Column (7) investigates whether time lags affect the efficacy of aid flows.  One might 
argue that aid does not become effective immediately, but only after a certain period of 
time. Introducing time lags reduces the sample size due to several gaps in the aid flow 
data. Running the OLS regression with time and bilateral fixed effects on this smaller 
sample, yields coefficient magnitudes similar in profile to columns (1) and (2), but 
coefficients on the aid flows are not generally statistically significant.    
 
In sum, the evidence suggests that aid for trade facilitation is positively related to both 
exports and imports of the recipients, that the relationship to importer’s trade flows is 
somewhat larger (which could indicate that aid flows to donors continues to be 
important). On the other hand, when considering trade between recipients and donors, 
excluding intra-donor trade, the relationship between aid and exports is relatively larger 
than the relationship between aid and imports suggesting the importance of A4TF for 
enabling exports to the developed world.   
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IV.2. Narrow vs. Broad and Soft vs. Hard Aid for Trade Facilitation 
 
Twenty-three different types of aid for trade facilitation are incorporated into the OECD-
CRS category Trade Policy and Regulations, which is our narrow category of aid for 
trade facilitation, totaling a bit less than US$ 300 million in 2005.  In the other two trade-
related aid categories (Trade Development and Economic Infrastructure), which 
correspond to our broad definition, there are eighty-three categories of aid, totaling just 
under US$8.5 billion.  Why bother to investigate this distinction between broad and 
narrow?   
 
The Trade Policy and Regulations/narrow type of aid assistance is targeted explicitly 
towards enhancing the trade policy system in countries—their ability to navigate TBT, 
SPS, and TRIPS.  These types of aid flows are focused on customs, transparency, and 
government procurement. Aid is directed toward learning to negotiate market access, 
implement RTAs, address dispute settlement, and accession issues.  Thus, this type of aid 
for trade facilitation is narrowly focused on the country as it directly interacts with the 
trading system itself.  Therefore, this aid might have a relatively bigger effect on trade 
flows because it is targeted directly to trading system issues.  Table 2 compares the key 
coefficients for the narrow definition of aid-for-trade-facilitation and for the broad 
definition of aid-for-trade-facilitation flows. 
 
Using the same country groupings and specifications as in Table 1, Table 2 shows that 
A4TF, of both types, generally is positively related to trade flows.  In the top panel 
(narrow definition) in columns (1) and (2) the estimated coefficients are again highly 
statistically significant and positive. The magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat 
higher than those in Table 1.  In addition, the coefficients relating narrow aid flows to 
exports are generally larger than those for imports, when both are significant.  The 
bottom panel considers the much larger broad A4TF category yields results that suggest 
that A4TF focused on these broad categories are more strongly related to imports and 
generally not related to exports.     
 
The observation that aid targeted to Trade Policy and Regulations—the narrow 
definition of A4TF—is positively associated with exports whereas broad A4TF is 
positively associated with imports is notable. It seems to be intuitive that it is difficult to 
apply policies for trade development and economic infrastructure in a way that favors one 
type of trade flows. However, trade policy and regulations—the narrow targeted aid—
may more directly attempt to expand exports without offering the same treatment to 
incoming trade flows.  For example, the narrow definition of aid flows focuses on 
implementing RTAs, which can present a challenge for market access for exporters.  
 
Another difference between the two types of aid is the implied economic magnitude.  
Given the much smaller dollar value of the aid included in regressions with the narrow 
definition, it is apparent that the ‘bang for the buck’ of these types of aid-for-trade 
facilitation programs could be more economically significant.  Taking the coefficients in 
column (4) (sum to 0.018), suggests that a 1 % increase in extensions of narrowly 
targeted aid (just US$ 3 million) could be associated with an increase in trade of some   14
US$ 711 millions (0.018*amount of trade in 2005 )—a much bigger ‘trade bang for the 




Table 2: Narrow vs. Broad Definition (Bilateral 5-Year Fixed Effects and Year Fixed 
Effects Included) 
 


































Narrow Aid Definition 
ln_itfa 0.005***  0.004**  -0.005 0.007**  0.003  0.004**  0.001 
ln_etfa 0.004***  0.005***  0.011  0.011*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.004 
L.ln_itfa           0.005 
L2.ln_itfa          0.004 
L.ln_etfa           0.006** 
L2.ln_etfa          0.001 
Broad Aid Definition 
ln_itfa 0.011***  0.011***  -0.023 0.017***  0.013***  0.011*** 0.010* 
ln_etfa -0.001  -0.001  0.021 -0.001 -0.005* -0.001  0.002 
L.ln_itfa           0.059*** 
L2.ln_itfa          0.004 
L.ln_etfa           0.003 
L2.ln_etfa          -0.001 
Robust standard errors in brackets; includes Bilateral 5 year fixed effects, year effects  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
See appendix tables for all coefficients       
 
 
In Table 3 we consider hard vs. soft aid flows.  Soft aid (such as education and training, 
administration and management, and aid for trade policy and regulatory adherence) is 
positively and significantly associated with more imports, but more often then not is not 
related to exports.  A4TF directed toward hard infrastructure (such as ports, but also 
industry-sectoral targeted aid programs) is mixed in terms of relationship to trade, and 
often appears to not statistically related to trade flows.   
 
A key aid category that is in both soft and broad relates to the financial sector.  Thus, 
reconciling these various results points to additional research on the role that trade 





Table 3: Soft vs. Hard Definition (Bilateral 5-Year Fixed Effects and Year Fixed Effects 
Included) 
 


































Soft Aid Definition 
ln_itfa 0.004*  0.004*  0.068**  0.024*** 0.004  0.004 0.024*** 
ln_etfa -0.002  -0.002  0.057*  -0.009 -0.007** -0.002  0.000 
L.ln_itfa     0.046*** 
L2.ln_itfa     0.020*** 
L.ln_etfa     0.002 
L2.ln_etfa       0.004 
Hard Aid Definition 
ln_itfa 0.004*  0.004  -0.012 0.015***  0.005  0.004  0.017** 
ln_etfa 0.002  0.002  0.047**  0.001  0  0.001  -0.001 
L.ln_itfa     0.058*** 
L2.ln_itfa     0.003 
L.ln_etfa     -0.005 
L2.ln_etfa                0.006* 
Robust standard errors in brackets; includes bilateral 5 year fixed effects, year effects  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
See appendix tables for all coefficients    
 
IV.3. Robustness Checks and Analysis  
 
A robustness check, as well as to compare with other research, is to examine the results 
using a standard gravity model specification without the fixed effects specification.  
Table 4 indicates that a more standard approach to the gravity specification (including 
various dummy variables and distance for example) gives somewhat different results.  
Coefficients on the aid variables tend to be larger, particularly when trade between 
recipients is considered (compare column (3) and (5), and aid flows appear to be 
negatively related to imports when lags are considered (column 7).  Thus, specification is 
an important concern when examining the potential role for aid to enhance trade.     





Table 4: Aid for Trade Facilitation: Gravity Model with Dummy Variables  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






























ln_dist  -1.117*** -1.110*** -1.318*** -1.162*** -1.331*** -1.136*** -0.912*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.033] [0.015] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] 
ln_tariff  -0.141*** -0.246*** -0.320*** -0.300*** -0.245*** -0.252*** -0.356*** 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.066] [0.030] [0.027] [0.022] [0.040] 
ln_rep_gdp  1.085*** 1.169*** 1.107*** 1.202*** 1.116*** 1.184*** 1.198*** 
  [0.004] [0.006] [0.027] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] 
ln_part_gdp  1.269*** 1.244*** 1.195*** 1.322*** 1.271*** 1.254*** 1.196*** 
  [0.004] [0.006] [0.026] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] 
ln_itfa  0.009*** 0.000  0.125*** 0.002  0.006*** 0.000  -0.016*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.019] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
ln_etfa  0.012*** 0.015*** 0.219*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.020] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
comcol  1.004*** 0.974*** 0.794*** 0.832*** 0.980*** 0.966*** 1.292*** 
  [0.034] [0.034] [0.075] [0.043] [0.037] [0.034] [0.077] 
curcol -0.897**  -0.958**  0.000  -3.119*** -3.085***  -1.009**  -0.007 
  [0.412] [0.409] [0.000] [1.118] [0.551] [0.405] [0.256] 
comlang_off  0.892*** 0.912*** 0.936*** 0.830*** 0.657*** 0.926*** 0.936*** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.060] [0.028] [0.030] [0.020] [0.028] 
contig  1.076*** 1.057*** 1.255*** 1.264*** 1.114*** 1.171*** 0.833*** 
  [0.048] [0.048] [0.111] [0.076] [0.053] [0.049] [0.071] 
smctry  0.876*** 0.882*** 0.638*** 0.805*** 0.605*** 0.774*** 1.171*** 
  [0.067] [0.067] [0.151] [0.100] [0.071] [0.068] [0.112] 
ln_area_rep  -0.117*** -0.169*** -0.197*** -0.186*** -0.165*** -0.181*** -0.191*** 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.020] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] 
ln_area_part -0.096***  -0.078***  0.022 -0.098*** -0.116*** -0.081*** -0.052*** 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.020] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.167***  -0.054 -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.179*** -0.330*** 
   [0.009] [0.037] [0.014] [0.013] [0.009] [0.017] 
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.046*** 0.227***  0.005  -0.014 0.043*** 0.068*** 
   [0.008] [0.037] [0.013] [0.012] [0.008] [0.011] 
L.ln_itfa         0.002 
         [0.003] 
L2.ln_itfa         -0.006** 
         [0.003] 
L.ln_etfa         0.006*** 
         [0.002] 
L2.ln_etfa         0.009*** 
         [0.002]   17
Observations 108304  107806 12214 51652 57863  104631 44351 
R-squared 0.688  0.69  0.596 0.658 0.608 0.673 0.698 
Robust standard errors in brackets 




This paper links the literature on trade facilitation and trade with analysis on aid and 
trade.  We ask the question “to what extent is aid directed toward trade facilitation related 
to trade flows?”  The specific channels through which aid for trade facilitation might 
affect trade ranges from projects which seek to support regulatory reform, faster customs 
clearance, or improved telecommunications networks, for example. Our results suggest 
that aid directed toward trade facilitation has a small, but significant relationship to 
greater trade flows.  The relationship appears to be stronger for imports overall; although 
when aid is targeted toward trade policy and regulations, the relationship to exports 
appears more robust and of larger magnitude.   
 
Our results measure the average effect of A4TF on trade over the time period of 16 years. 
If we assume that the same estimated coefficients apply to aid and trade in the year 2007, 
we can simulate the potential impact on trade of a 1 % increase in A4TF (in USD terms). 
Using the trade flows and flow of aid for trade facilitation for the year 2007 and applying 
them to our main estimation results, we obtain the simulation results shown in Table 5a. 
This exercise also allows us to calculate the effectiveness of a 1 USD increase in boosting 
trade. Table 5b shows the simulated change in trade flows from a 1 USD increase in 
A4TF by different aid categories.  
 
 
Table 5a: Change in trade (million US Dollars) associated with 1 % increase in A4TF 
(by type of aid, trade flows 2007) 
 



































Narrow  818.01 818.01  - 964.11  -  655.28  - 
Broad  999.79  999.79  -  912.52 364.03 810.44  908.90 
Soft  363.56 363.56 952.41  1285.48 -202.97  -  2181.36 
Hard  363.56 - -  803.43  -  -  1545.13 
All A4TF   545.34 454.45 666.94 583.98  85.18  368.46  - 
 
 






Table 5b: Change in trade (in US Dollars) associated with 1 US Dollar increase in A4TF 
(by type of aid, trade flows 2007) 
 



































Narrow  696.64  696.64 -  821.06  -  558.06 - 
Broad  9.66  9.66  -  8.82 3.52 7.83  8.78 
Soft  7.88  7.88 20.63 27.85  -4.40  - 47.25 
Hard  6.21 - -  13.73  -  -  26.41 
All A4TF  5.21 4.34 6.37 5.58  0.81  3.52  - 
 
The key results of Table 5 can be summarized as follows:  
 
  In 2007, aid for trade facilitation amounted to about US$ 10.5 billion.  If this level 
of aid flow increased by 1% (US$ 105 million), the increase in global trade could 
be about US$ 545 million (see column 1, Table 5a). This yields a ‘rate of return’ 
on each 1US$ aid extension of US$ 5 (US$ 545 million divided by US$ 105 
million) (see column 1, Table 5b). 
 
  Considering the much narrower definition of aid for trade facilitation, that is 
considering only the extensions of aid to trade policy reform and regulatory 
reform, based on aid from 2007 data of US$ 117 million, a 1% increase in aid 
(US$ 11.7 million) could generate a trade increase of about US$ 818 million (see 
column 1, Table 5a).  This yields a ‘rate of return’ on every additional dollar of 
aid of about US$ 697 (see column 1, Table 5b). 
 
 
Within the context of the global financial crisis, these findings are particularly 
noteworthy.  They suggest that economic growth could be effectively stimulated through 
a targeted aid-for-trade agenda that emphasizes trade facilitating investments with the 
highest returns – specifically those reforms associated with trade policy and regulation.  
Furthermore, ongoing dialogue to address coordination and monitoring of trade-related 
aid might consider our results, in regard to strengthening aid effectiveness.   
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VII. Appendix 
 
ANNEX 1: BROAD TRADE FACILITATION 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
















210     TRANSPORT AND STORAGE    
   21010  Transport policy and administrative management  s 
   21020  Road transport  h 
   21030  Rail transport  h 
   21040  Water transport  h 
   21050  Air transport  h 
   21061  Storage  h 
   21081  Education and training in transport and storage  s 
220     COMMUNICATIONS    
   22010  Communications policy and administrative 
management  s 
   22020  Telecommunications  h 
   22030  Radio/television/print media  h 
   22040  Information and communication technology (ICT)  h 
230     ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLY    
   23010  Energy policy and administrative management  s 
   23020  Power generation/non-renewable sources   h 
   23030  Power generation/renewable sources   h 
   23040  Electrical transmission/ distribution  h 
   23050  Gas distribution  h 
   23061  Oil-fired power plants  h 
   23062  Gas-fired power plants  h 
   23063  Coal-fired power plants  h 
   23064  Nuclear power plants  h 
   23065  Hydro-electric power plants  h 
   23066  Geothermal energy  h 
   23067  Solar energy  h 
   23068  Wind power  h 
   23069  Ocean power  h 
   23070  Biomass  h 
   23081  Energy education/training  s 
   23082  Energy research  s 
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TRADE DEVELOPMENT  
Class Aid  Category  Description  Soft/Hard
 



















   24010  Financial policy and administrative management  s 
   24020  Monetary institutions  s 
   24030  Formal sector financial intermediaries  s 
   24040  Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries  s 
   24081  Education/training in banking and financial services  s 
250     BUSINESS AND OTHER SERVICES    
   25010  Business support services and institutions  s 
311     AGRICULTURE    
   31110  Agricultural policy and administrative management  s 
   31120  Agricultural development  s 
   31130  Agricultural land resources  h 
   31140  Agricultural water resources  h 
   31150  Agricultural inputs  h 
   31161  Food crop production  h 
   31162  Industrial crops/export crops  h 
   31163  Livestock  h 
   31164  Agrarian reform  h 
   31165  Agricultural alternative development  h 
   31166  Agricultural extension  h 
   31181  Agricultural education/training  s 
   31182  Agricultural research  s 
   31191  Agricultural services  s 
   31192  Plant and post-harvest protection and pest control  h 
   31193  Agricultural financial services  s 
   31194  Agricultural co-operatives  s 
   31195  Livestock/veterinary services  s 
312     FORESTRY    
   31210  Forestry policy and administrative management  s 
   31220  Forestry development  h 
   31261  Fuelwood/charcoal  h 
   31281  Forestry education/training  s 
   31282  Forestry research  s 
321     INDUSTRY    
   32110  Industrial policy and administrative management  s 
   32120  Industrial development  h 
   32130  SME development  s 
   32140  Cottage industries and handicraft  h 
   32161  Agro-industries  h 
   32162  Forest industries  h 
   32163  Textiles, leather and substitutes  h 
   32164  Chemicals   h 
   32165  Fertilizer plants  h 
   32166  Cement/lime/plaster  h 
   32167  Energy manufacturing  h 
   32168  Pharmaceutical production  h   24
   32169  Basic metal industries  h 
   32170  Non-ferrous metal industries  h 
   32171  Engineering  h 
   32172  Transport equipment industry  h 
   32182  Technological research and development  s 
322     MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINING    
   32210  Mineral/mining policy and administrative management  s 
   32220  Mineral prospection and exploration  h 
   32261  Coal  h 
   32262  Oil and gas  h 
   32263  Ferrous metals  h 
   32264  Nonferrous metals  h 
   32265  Precious metals/materials  h 
   32266  Industrial minerals  h 
 
 
332     TOURISM    
 
 
   33210  Tourism policy and administrative management  s 
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ANNEX 2: NARROW TRADE FACILITATION  
 
TRADE POLICY AND REGULATON  

































   33110  Trade policy and administrative management  s 
   33111 - Trade mainstreaming in PRSPs/development plans  s 
   33112 - Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  s 
   33113 - Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS)  s 
   33120  Trade facilitation  s 
   33121 - Trade facilitation procedures  s 
   33122 - Customs valuation  s 
   33123 - Tariff reforms  s 
   33130  Regional trade agreements (RTAs)  s 
   33140  Multilateral trade negotiations  s 
   33141 - Accession  s 
   33142 - Dispute settlement  s 
   33143 - Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS)  s 
   33144 - Agriculture  s 
   33145 - Services  s 
   33146 - Tariff negotiations - non-agricultural market access  s 
   33147 - Rules  s 
   33148 - Training in trade negotiation techniques  s 
   33151 - Trade and environment  s 
   33152 - Trade and competition  s 
   33153 - Trade and investment  s 
   33154 - Transparency and government procurement  s 




ANNEX 3: AID FOR TRADE FACILITATION FLOWS (disbursed in 2007)  
 










Infrastructure 5241 Broad  10349 Hard  5850
Trade development  5108 Narrow  117 Soft  4616
Trade policy and regulation  117       
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ANNEX 4:  REGRESSION TABLES 
 
 
Table 1:  Aid for Trade Facilitation Narrow Definition: Bilateral-5Year Fixed Effects 
and Year Fixed Effects Included 
 
 


































ln_tariff -0.199***  -0.199***  -0.228**  -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.200*** -0.214*** 
  [0.035] [0.035] [0.104] [0.048]  [0.043]  [0.036] [0.075] 
ln_rep_gdp 0.710***  1.557***  -4.740*** 0.62  1.405***  1.504***  3.828*** 
  [0.045] [0.324] [1.294] [0.484]  [0.465]  [0.328] [1.024] 
ln_part_gdp 0.257***  -0.710***  -7.441***  -2.380*** -1.570*** -0.765***  -0.069 
  [0.036] [0.271] [1.732] [0.495]  [0.408]  [0.275] [0.614] 
ln_itfa 0.005***  0.004**  -0.005 0.007**  0.003  0.004**  0.001 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.004] 
ln_etfa 0.004***  0.005***  0.011  0.011*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.004 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.011] [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.001] [0.002] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.849***  5.402***  0.062 -0.598  -0.795**  -3.438*** 
   [0.321]  [1.279]  [0.476]  [0.451]  [0.325]  [1.034] 
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.972***  7.767***  2.621*** 1.705*** 1.025***  0.359 
   [0.265]  [1.718]  [0.483]  [0.397]  [0.269]  [0.602] 
L.ln_itfa           0.005 
           [0.006] 
L2.ln_itfa           0.004 
           [0.005] 
L.ln_etfa           0.006** 
           [0.002] 
L2.ln_etfa           0.001 
           [0.002] 
Observations 108304  107806  12424  52181  57861  104637  32592 
Number of Bilat - 5year F.E.  39309  39125  6576  22181  25237  38386  13461 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
/1/ A4TF “Aid for Trade Facilitation’ 
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Table 2:  Aid for Trade Facilitation Broad  Definition: Bilateral-5Year Fixed Effects and 
Year Fixed Effects Included 
 
 


































ln_tariff  -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.421*** -0.225*** -0.219*** -0.203*** -0.321*** 
  [0.035] [0.035] [0.067] [0.039]  [0.043]  [0.036] [0.073] 
ln_rep_gdp 0.692***  1.604***  -1.416* 1.525*** 1.595*** 1.540***  3.075*** 
  [0.045] [0.322] [0.856] [0.367]  [0.468]  [0.327] [1.011] 
ln_part_gdp 0.253***  -0.688**  -4.187***  -1.509*** -1.558*** -0.748***  -0.032 
  [0.036] [0.270] [0.924] [0.338]  [0.416]  [0.274] [0.612] 
ln_itfa 0.011***  0.011***  -0.023 0.017***  0.013***  0.011*** 0.010* 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.015] [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.005] 
ln_etfa -0.001  -0.001  0.021  -0.001 -0.005* -0.001  0.002 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.003] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.908***  2.310***  -0.828** -0.788* -0.843***  -2.711*** 
   [0.319]  [0.852]  [0.364]  [0.454]  [0.323]  [1.015] 
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.944***  4.149***  1.691*** 1.695*** 1.003***  0.333 
   [0.264]  [0.913]  [0.331]  [0.404]  [0.267]  [0.600] 
L.ln_itfa           0.059*** 
           [0.009] 
L2.ln_itfa           0.004 
           [0.006] 
L.ln_etfa           0.003 
           [0.003] 
L2.ln_etfa           -0.001 
           [0.003] 
Observations 108304  107806  29421  86913  57822  104639  32592 
Number of Bilat - 5year F.E.  39309  39125  13284  32882  25231  38388  13461 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
/1/ A4TF “Aid for Trade Facilitation’ 
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Table 3: Soft  Aid for Trade Facilitation : Bilateral-5Year Fixed Effects and Year Fixed 
Effects Included 
 


































ln_tariff -0.199***  -0.199***  -0.245**  -0.221*** -0.214*** -0.201*** -0.289*** 
  [0.035] [0.035] [0.104] [0.048]  [0.043]  [0.036] [0.072] 
ln_rep_gdp 0.688***  1.574***  -4.733*** 0.617  1.393***  1.508***  2.079** 
  [0.045] [0.323] [1.290] [0.483]  [0.466]  [0.327] [1.038] 
ln_part_gdp 0.254***  -0.697***  -7.587***  -2.338*** -1.584*** -0.759***  -0.011 
  [0.036] [0.270] [1.742] [0.494]  [0.407]  [0.274] [0.610] 
ln_soft_rep 0.004*  0.004*  0.068** 0.024***  0.004  0.004  0.024*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.031] [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.007] 
ln_soft_part -0.002  -0.002  0.057* -0.009  -0.007** -0.002  0 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.030] [0.006]  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.003] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.882***  5.352***  0.041  -0.6  -0.814**  -1.596 
   [0.320]  [1.274]  [0.474]  [0.451]  [0.324]  [1.046] 
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.955***  7.919***  2.576*** 1.720*** 1.015***  0.312 
   [0.264]  [1.726]  [0.482]  [0.396]  [0.267]  [0.599] 
L.ln_soft_rep           0.046*** 
           [0.008] 
L2.ln_soft_rep           0.020*** 
           [0.005] 
L.ln_soft_part           0.002 
           [0.003] 
L2.ln_soft_part           0.004 
           [0.003] 
Observations 108304  107806  12424  52181  57861  104637  32592 
Number of Bilat - 5year F.E.  39309  39125  6576  22181  25237  38386  13461 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
/1/ A4TF “Aid for Trade Facilitation’ 
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Table 4: Hard  Aid for Trade Facilitation : Bilateral-5Year Fixed Effects and Year Fixed 
Effects Included 
 


































ln_tariff -0.200***  -0.201***  -0.233**  -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.202*** -0.319*** 
  [0.035] [0.035] [0.104] [0.048]  [0.043]  [0.036] [0.073] 
ln_rep_gdp 0.686***  1.599***  -4.770*** 0.757  1.394***  1.534***  3.274*** 
  [0.045] [0.322] [1.292] [0.482]  [0.466]  [0.327] [1.008] 
ln_part_gdp 0.253***  -0.689**  -7.763***  -2.345*** -1.569*** -0.750***  -0.092 
  [0.036] [0.270] [1.744] [0.495]  [0.407]  [0.274] [0.612] 
ln_hard_rep 0.004*  0.004  -0.012 0.015***  0.005  0.004  0.017** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.024] [0.005]  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.008] 
ln_hard_part 0.002  0.002  0.047** 0.001  0  0.001  -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.023] [0.006]  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.004] 
ln_rep_gdp_cap   -0.909***  5.422***  -0.092  -0.6  -0.843***  -2.915*** 
   [0.320]  [1.277]  [0.473]  [0.452]  [0.324]  [1.012] 
ln_part_gdp_cap   0.945***  8.092***  2.581*** 1.702*** 1.004***  0.386 
   [0.264]  [1.727]  [0.483]  [0.396]  [0.267]  [0.600] 
L.ln_hard_rep           0.058*** 
           [0.009] 
L2.ln_hard_rep           0.003 
           [0.006] 
L.ln_hard_part           -0.005 
           [0.004] 
L2.ln_hard_part           0.006* 
           [0.004] 
Observations 108304  107806  12424  52181  57861  104637  32592 
Number of Bilat - 5year F.E.  39309  39125  6576  22181  25237  38386  13461 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
/1/ A4TF “Aid for Trade Facilitation’ 
Includes Bilateral- 5 year fixed effects and year fixed effects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 